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from the UK food and beverages sector 
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Abstract: This study investigates the pricing decisions of the UK food and beverages sector 
over 2007-2016. The markup model formulated by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) is 
employed where market power is expressed in terms of pricing decisions reflected by the 
difference between the price level and the marginal cost of production. The analysis is 
conducted under three steps: the first step estimates the markup ratio of the UK food and 
beverages sector over 2007-2016; the second step provides the price-cost margin of the 32 4 
digit level NACE Rev.2 constituent industries over 2007-2016; and the last step tests the 
relationship between cross-sectional estimates of market power and the structural effects of 
concentration, liquidity and exports over 2009, 2011, 2015 and 2016. The results suggest the 
presence of imperfect competitive conduct in the sector, while the three structural effects 
appear to have a significant influence on the pricing decisions of the UK food and beverages 
industries. 
 
Keywords: Markup ratio, UK, Food and beverages sector, Concentration, Liquidity, Hall-
Roeger approach. 
 
JEL Classifications: L16, L13, L66, D43, E31 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire Business School, Department of Accounting, Finance and 
Economics. 
c.amountzias@herts.ac.uk  
2 Hertfordshire Business School, De Havilland Campus, Hatfield AL10 9AB, Hertfordshire, United Kingdom. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The empirical literature of investigating the presence and extent of market power in various 
industries has been focused on the OECD countries over the recent years (Christopoulou and 
Vermeulen, 2012; Afonso and Costa, 2013; Polemis and Fotis, 2016). The UK is considered 
to be amongst the strongest economies in this group as the value of nominal GDP is the fifth 
largest across the globe. The financial crisis of 2008 restricted production and demand in 
many economies which led to the introduction of contractionary fiscal policies (Batini et al., 
2012; Bird and Mandilaras, 2013). The UK was amongst those economies that implemented 
such policies in order to achieve particular fiscal targets, thus causing a decrease in aggregate 
demand (Farnsworth, 2011; O'Hara, 2015). As a result, production was expected to fall and 
alter the market conditions in various industries. 
 According to the World Bank database (2016a), the most influential industries in the 
UK economy are the service and manufacturing industries. In particular, the service industry 
accounts for 78% of gross value added, while the manufacturing industry accounts for 11%. 
The latter industry is the eleventh strongest industry across the world and contributes 
approximately 54% to UK exports. Consequently, the manufacturing industry is of crucial 
importance to the economic activities of the UK as many primary consuming needs are 
satisfied by manufacturing products. For this reason, the price level charged by producers is 
of great importance to consumers given that many products do not have immediate 
substitutes and thus, their consumption is necessary. 
 The pricing decisions of the UK manufacturing industry have been investigated by 
several studies, such as Görg and Warzynski (2003, 2006), under which they identified a 
significant but low degree of overpricing behaviour. According to the theory of perfect 
competition, there is no evidence of overpricing decisions and thus, market power, when the 
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selling price is equal to the marginal cost of production. The aforementioned studies utilize 
this particular concept in order to identify the degree of imperfect competition in the UK 
manufacturing industry. However, a significant limitation lies on the fact that the 
manufacturing firms are grouped into 2-digit ISIC aggregated sectors. An empirical analysis 
of this kind cannot identify the pricing decisions and behaviour of constituent industries or 
even individual firms. 
 On the other hand, there are hardly any studies that extend the analysis of market 
power to a disaggregated level. In particular, the food and beverages sector is the most 
influential sector in the UK manufacturing industry as it accounts for 22% of gross 
manufacturing value (Prodcom, UK, 2016). For this reason, the pricing behaviour of the 
constituent industries should be investigated in order to obtain a solid outcome on how firms 
tend to behave in the UK manufacturing sectors. 
 The price level and the cost of production are considered to be key elements of 
identifying the competitive structure in various markets. Competition tends to increase output 
growth by enhancing economic activity through increased production and consumption. This 
way, firms will increase their sales and innovation can be used as a tool of attracting 
additional customers. Consequently, there is a need of market indicators reflecting pricing 
and production decisions that can estimate the degree of market power in various industries.  
 The methodology presented by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) is going to be used in 
the present study to investigate the market structure in the UK food and beverages sector over 
2007-20163. In particular, it is employed under a three-step step approach as presented by 
Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011). The first step estimates the price-cost margin for the food and 
beverages sector over the period 2007-2016. The second step provides the markup ratios for 
                                                          
3 This period is very crucial to the UK economy as three major effects occurred: the global financial crisis in 
2008, the implementation of austerity policies initiated in 2010 and the EU referendum that took place in 2016. 
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the constituent 32 4-digit NACE Rev.2 food and beverages industries of the panel data set 
individually. Lastly, the third step identifies the relationship between the cross-sectional 
markup ratios obtained by the second step and the effects of concentration, liquidity and 
exports.  
The main contribution of this study is to identify the price-cost margin exercised by 
the UK food and beverages industries and test whether their relationship is significant with 
the aforementioned structural effects. For this reason, this paper aims to complement the 
empirical literature of pricing decisions and identify whether market concentration, liquidity 
constraints and exports can influence those decisions. 
 This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 includes the empirical literature review 
of the price-cost margin approach; Section 3 provides the model formulation and data 
analysis; Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results; and section 5 offers a 
conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
One of the major contributions in the empirical literature of pricing decisions has been 
made by Hall (1988) utilizing the assumption that under perfect competition the price level 
charged by firms is equal to the marginal cost of production. Hall showed that the nominal 
growth rate of the Solow Residual does not depend on the nominal growth rate of capital 
productivity, meaning that the calculation of the price-cost margin can be achieved without 
observing the marginal cost of production.  
Roeger (1995) extended this particular framework by incorporating elements that 
eliminate the unobservable productivity shock from the price-cost margin calculation, 
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providing an unbiased estimate of market power denoted in terms of pricing decisions. 
Thereby, the markup ratio is expressed as the difference between the growth rate of value 
added and the growth rate of inputs. 
The empirical formulation developed by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) corresponds 
to the Hall-Roeger approach and it is employed by many studies to investigate the pricing 
decisions of various sectors operating in the manufacturing industry. In particular, there are 
several studies that investigated the price-cost margin in the United States manufacturing 
industry. Shapiro (1987) and Norrbin (1993) estimated a positive price-cost margin exercised 
by the US manufacturing sectors suggesting that the market structure corresponds to 
imperfect competition. Mazumder (2014) supports the presence of countercyclical and falling 
markups since the 1960s because the price-cost margin depends on the share of 
manufacturing imports. For this reason, the increase of foreign competition over the years 
forced the US firms to adjust their price level downwards, thus converging to perfect 
competition. 
Moreover, Martins et al. (1996) applied the Hall-Roger approach in 14 OECD 
manufacturing sectors over 1970-1992.  The findings support the persistence of positive 
price-cost margins across the industries, thus validating the presence of imperfect 
competition. Bloch and Olive (2003) studied the pricing decisions in the manufacturing 
sectors of the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States and Japan over 1970-1991. They 
found that the pricing decisions of industries with high concentration are more likely to be 
influenced by competing foreign prices in contrast with low concentrated domestic-oriented 
industries that charge a lower selling price. 
Molnár and Bottini (2010) investigate the degree of market power in the 
manufacturing and service industries of a number of OECD European countries over 1993-
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2006. The estimates suggest that competition is more persistent in the sectors of the 
Scandinavian countries (excluding Sweden) and the United Kingdom, and lower in the 
sectors of Central European countries (see Polemis, 2014c).  Christopoulou and Vermeulen 
(2012) also identified the presence of imperfect competition in the industries of several 
European countries, concluding that the manufacturing industry on average is more 
competitive compared to the service industry.  
Nevertheless, Polemis and Fotis (2016) contradict these findings arguing that there is 
no evidence of imperfect competition in the majority of manufacturing and service sectors of 
the Eurozone, the US and Japan over 1970-2007. The main reason of this outcome refers to 
the openness of the constituent sectors to internationalisation and deregulation which results 
in low markup ratios due to intense competition. Amador and Soares (2014) provided 
evidence of market power in the Portuguese labour and product markets formulating a data 
set of 350,000 firms over 2006-2009. They found that high bargaining power results in higher 
price levels, thus suggesting that downward wage rigidity results in persistent higher price-
cost margins.  
Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2016) carried out a similar study for 
the Greek food and beverages sector and the manufacturing industry overall. Their findings 
support the presence of relatively high markups across the manufacturing sectors and over 
time, thus suggesting that the Greek manufacturing industry operates under imperfect 
competitive conduct. Polemis (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) also verified this outcome by 
concluding that the Greek manufacturing industry exhibits positive markups but it is less 
competitive compared to the service industry. 
Similar studies have also been developed for the UK manufacturing industry in recent 
years. In particular, Görg and Warzynski (2003) tested the markup dynamics over 1990-1996 
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and found that exporting firms tend to charge a higher markup ratio compared to non-
exporting firms even if they face foreign competition. A reason for this behaviour refers to 
product differentiation as product heterogeneity may be preferable to consumers even if the 
selling price is higher reflecting the cost of innovation. Görg and Warzynski (2006) also 
provided evidence that the price-cost margin gradually declined over 1989-1997 due to the 
industry’s exposure to foreign competition given the implementation of the Single European 
Market (SEM) in 1992. As a result, it can be concluded that the UK manufacturing industry 
has been experiencing positive price-cost margins over time, but their value is relatively low 
and close to perfect competition.  
Overall, the aforementioned studies support the presence of imperfect competition 
across many sectors through overpricing decisions. This shows that firms are able to exercise 
their market power on their pricing decisions in order to acquire additional profits. 
Consequently, social welfare is inefficient because consumer surplus is exploited. In this 
context, the Hall-Roger approach is a sufficient tool to investigate the pricing decisions and 
thus, the degree of market power in several sectors. 
 
3. Model formulation and data 
3.1. Empirical model 
The model employed in this study corresponds to the Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) 
approach in order to obtain unbiased estimates of market power expressed in terms of pricing 
decisions. In particular, an industry is assumed that faces a production function subject to 
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constant returns to scale. It produces output (𝑦𝑡) according to a homogeneous production 
function 𝑓 utilizing three inputs: intermediate inputs (𝑚𝑡)
4, labour (𝑙𝑡) and capital (𝑘𝑡) 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡𝑓(𝑚𝑡, 𝑙𝑡, 𝑘𝑡)                                                                                                                 (1) 
where 𝜃𝑡 is a total factor productivity index (Hicks neutral productivity term) capturing 
technological progress over time and t denotes the time interval. Consequently, the final 
formulation capturing the price-cost margin of the industry as utilized by Rezitis and Kalantzi 
(2011) is the difference between the following equations: 
𝛥𝑌𝑡 = (
𝛥𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡
+
𝛥𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡
) − (
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
+
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)                                                                                               (2a) 
𝛥𝑋𝑡 = 𝑎𝑚𝑡 [(
𝛥𝑚𝑡
𝑚𝑡
+
𝛥𝑝𝑚𝑡
𝑝𝑚𝑡
) − (
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
+
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)] + 𝑎𝑙𝑡 [(
𝛥𝑙𝑡
𝑙𝑡
+
𝛥𝑤𝑡
𝑤𝑡
) − (
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
+
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)]          (2b) 
where 𝑎𝑚𝑡 = 𝑝𝑚𝑡𝑚𝑡 𝑝𝑡𝑦𝑡⁄  is the share of intermediate inputs in output, 𝑝𝑚𝑡 refers to the 
price of intermediate inputs, 𝑎𝑙𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡 𝑝𝑡𝑦𝑡⁄  reflects the share of labour expenses in output, 
𝑤𝑡 is the wage rate, 𝑝𝑡 is the price level of output and 𝑢𝑡 is the user cost of capital. 𝛥𝑌𝑡 
reflects the growth rate of output per unit of capital, and 𝛥𝑋𝑡 represents the growth rate of 
intermediate inputs and labour expenses per unit of capital.  
This formulation is employed to estimate the price-cost margin in the UK food and 
beverages sector and industries over 2007-2016 and to identify the degree of market power 
exercised through pricing decisions. The difference between the growth rates of (2a) and (2b) 
reflects the markup ratio exercised in the industry. When that value is equal to unity, it 
denotes that output grows exactly equal to production costs and thus, the industry is under 
                                                          
4 As intermediate inputs we refer to the goods and services used in the intermediate process to produce the final 
product. Raw materials, semi-finished goods and energy can be considered as some of those inputs. 
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perfect competition. Any value above unity suggests that the price level is not equal to the 
marginal cost of production.  
 Nevertheless, the Hall-Roeger approach has been mainly criticised over the exclusion 
of any unobservable productivity shocks. As reflected by equations (2a) and (2b), only the 
growth rates of output and inputs are included in the markup estimation. De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012) take into account a production function without assuming constant returns 
to scale and they allow for serially correlated unobserved productivity shocks affected by 
firm decisions5. In addition, they estimate the markup model in levels and not in first 
differences, thus increasing the accuracy of the estimates. For this reason, they compare and 
contrast the results with Hall’s model finding a downward bias of the latter model equivalent 
to 12%. This shows a comparison between the growth rates might underestimate the price-
cost margin6. 
Even if such limitations apply, the Hall-Roeger model has been employed across the 
literature due to its computational simplicity and its inclusion of the price and volume of 
output and inputs. Also, it allows for firm-level data to be taken into account which extends 
market analysis to disaggregated industries7. For this reason, it has spread across industrial 
organisation and international trade analyses, thus rendering it a reliable tool of market 
structure investigation even if unobservable productivity shocks are not taken into account8. 
                                                          
5 Recent studies, such as Bellone et al. (2016) and De Loecker et al. (2016) also employ a similar methodology 
where the markup estimation depends on the elasticity of output with respect to inputs and the share of input 
expenditures on total value added. 
6 An additional markup formulation employed by Braun and Raddatz (2016) calculates the price-cost margin as 
the rate of change between labour cost and total value added. Even if the value of intermediate inputs is 
included, this indicator lacks the growth dynamics of the Hall-Roeger approach and the inclusion of the user 
cost of capital. 
7 Levinsohn (1993) and Harisson (1994) applied micro-level production data to the Hall model. 
8 As Görg and Warzynski (2003, 2006) employed the Hall-Roeger approach, it would be useful to adopt the 
same methodology and compare the markup estimates in the UK food and beverages sector. 
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 Consequently, the main objective of the analysis is to investigate whether the 4-digit 
level industries of the panel set have been exercising their market power on their pricing 
decisions. The first step estimates the Hall-Roeger equation for the UK food and beverages 
sector over 2007-2016 to obtain the markup ratio exercised in the market. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that  
𝛥𝑌𝑡 = 𝜇𝛥𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                     (3) 
where 𝜇 reflects the price-cost margin of the sector over the time period and 𝜀𝑡 is the error 
term of the equation. The estimated parameter 𝜇 takes into account the whole panel of the 
constituent industries separately in order to obtain an aggregate estimation for the sector. 
 The second step employs the cross-section specification of Hall-Roeger approach by 
estimating the markup ratios for every constituent industry individually over 2007-2016. As a 
result, equation (3) is transformed into 
𝛥𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝐷𝑆𝑖𝛥𝑋𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                      (4) 
where 𝜇𝑖 is the markup ratio of each 4-digit level industry i and 𝐷𝑆𝑖 is a cross section dummy 
variable (i=1,..,N denotes the number of the constituent industries) which is set to one for 
industry i and zero otherwise. This variable allows the estimation of potential individual 
effects reflected by the food and beverages industries on the sectorial price-cost margin 
obtained in the first step. 
 The third and last step of this study presents the markup formulation under which the 
markup ratios estimated for the food and beverages 4-digit level industries are tested with 
respect to three structural effects. Those effects refer to industrial concentration, liquidity and 
exports which are considered to be of great importance to pricing decisions (Bloch and Olive, 
2003). In particular, the markup formulation is provided by 
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𝜇𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝑐1ℎ𝑖 + 𝑐2𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝑐3𝑙𝑟𝑖 + 𝑐4𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖                                                                           (5) 
where 𝑐 is the constant term,  ℎ𝑖  is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of each 4-digit 
level industry i expressed as the sum of squares of the market share of each constituent firm 
in terms of turnover9, 𝑒𝑠𝑖 reflects the ratio of each industry’s establishments to the number of 
total establishments in the sector, 𝑙𝑟𝑖 denotes the liquidity ratio of each industry i expressed as 
the sum of net current assets over the sum of current liabilities of each firm10, 𝑥𝑝𝑖 is the 
intensity of exports of each industry denoted as the ratio of exports to operating revenue and 
𝑣𝑖 is the independent error term of the formulation. The former measure is used to obtain the 
value of market concentration and identify whether there is a significant effect on the price-
cost margin. It is expected that industries with higher concentration will exhibit a higher 
markup ratio as they can increase their revenue given their market share.  
The second variable is included in equation (5) in order to support the concentration 
effect in terms of establishments. Theoretically, as the number of firms increases in the 
market, competition tends to be more intensive by lowering the price level and thus, the 
price-cost margin11. The third measure captures the effect of liquidity in the pricing decisions 
of firms. In particular, the liquidity ratio is formulated as the ratio of current assets minus any 
stock, work in progress and finished products over the current liabilities of the constituent 
firms12. Consequently, it reflects the net current assets that firms can liquefy in order to meet 
their current liabilities. This indicator is considered to express the short-run behaviour of any 
                                                          
9 See Konings et al. (2005) and Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) for more information on the index formulation. 
10 This indicator has been formulated according to the indications of Makaw and Maksimovic (2013). 
11 However, the number of establishments may not reflect this particular outcome because concentrated sectors 
with a limited number of firms may own a significantly high number of establishments. For this reason, the 
establishments ratio is used as a measure of market concentration rather than a proxy of the number of firms (see 
Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2011). 
12 Net current assets are defined as the sum of trade debtors, bank and deposits, group loans (asset), directors’ 
loans, other debtors, prepayments, deferred taxation and investments. Current liabilities is the sum of trade 
creditors, short term loans, corporation tax, dividends, accruals and def. inc., social securities and VAT, and 
other current liabilities. 
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firm if it is called to meet its current liabilities immediately13. For this reason, net current 
assets are considered to be a crucial factor in pricing decisions as available liquidity may 
affect the price-cost margin14.  
 The last parameter of equation (5) is the intensity of exports of each industry 
individually. Görg and Warzynski (2003) supported that export-oriented firms tend to charge 
a higher price-cost margin due to the competitive advantage enjoyed by product 
differentiation. Therefore, the present study intends to investigate the validity of this claim 
over 2009, 2011, 2015 and 2016 and conclude whether exporting firms exercise their market 
power on their pricing decisions. If a similar outcome is obtained, then exporting firms may 
have the option to adjust their price level to various challenges that may face in international 
markets by offsetting short-run revenue losses with their available liquid assets. 
3.2. Data 
Table 1: Market characteristics of the constituent 32 4-digit NACE Rev.2 industries. 
4-digit 
NACE 
Rev.2 
industries 
No. of  
establishments 
Size of  
industry  
(% of 
turnover) 
Industrial 
concentration 
Current 
assets/ 
current 
liabilities 
Export 
share 
Import 
share 
1011 
416 7.7% 7.1% 1.808 9% 6% 
1012 
175 5.4% 
17.6% 
2.148 1.6% 3% 
1013 
670 6.6% 3.8% 1.859 2.4% 8.5% 
1020 
382 3.4% 5.4% 1.571 5.8% 8% 
1031 
69 2.2% 10.8% 1.562 1.1% 1.2% 
1032 
51 0.3% 34.2% 0.937 0.5% 1.7% 
                                                          
13 Also see Braun and Raddatz (2016) on how liquidity constraints influence the price-cost margin. 
14 It is expected that firms with higher liquidity ratio will tend to charge a higher price-cost margin as they can 
offset any loss in consumer demand with liquid assets (Lane, 2012). However, if economic uncertainty prevails, 
the primary aim of firms could be their long-run sustainability and survival. For this reason, even firms with 
relatively high net current assets may tend to charge a lower price-cost margin in order to prevent any loss in 
consumer demand and thus, any loss in revenue. 
13 
 
1039 
515 4.8% 6.1% 1.607 1.6% 5.7% 
1041 
57 0.9% 11.5% 1.287 2.1% 4.8% 
1051 
459 8.6% 7.3% 1.579 7.9% 6.3% 
1052 
297 0.4% 46% 1.666 0.6% 0.5% 
1061 
177 4.5% 8.3% 1.547 4.8% 2.3% 
1071 
3,037 7.4% 5.3% 1.418 1.4% 1.2% 
1072 
278 4.2% 21.6% 1.538 4.4% 3.4% 
1073 
30 0.1% 36.6% 1.063 0.3% 1.1% 
1081 
7 0.9% 35.5% 1.836 0.8% 1.4% 
1082 
422 4.5% 12.4% 4.277 5.8% 6.1% 
1083 
85 2.5% 21% 1.417 3.8% 2.4% 
1084 
198 1.9% 13.1% 5.023 1.8% 1.9% 
1085 
143 2.9% 19% 2.917 6% 15.2% 
1091 
350 5.1% 5.9% 2.195 3.4% 0.9% 
1101 
298 5.7% 50% 2.763 27.9% 3.1% 
1102 
476 0.2% 40% 2.345 0.1% 10.5% 
1103 
88 1.4% 17% 1.872 0.3% 0.4% 
1105 
1,223 9.4% 38.2% 1.601 3.3% 1.1% 
1106 
29 0.6% 26.3% 0.838 1% 0.1% 
1107 
469 7.5% 9.9% 1.637 1.7% 2.7% 
Total  
10,401 
 
100% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
100% 
 
100% 
Source: FAME database and IBIS World reports. 
 
 The dataset is obtained from the FAME, the AMECO, the World Bank databases and 
the IBISWorld reports. The sample comprises of annual data on 32 4-digit level NACE Rev.2 
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classification industries over 2007-2016, as presented in Table A1 of appendix15. The number 
of firms taken into consideration in this sample is 1,560 across the UK and all of them satisfy 
the requirement of available nominal data for the estimation of equations (3)-(5)16. 
 For the output variable, operating revenue or turnover is used, as total value added 
does not allow the inclusion of intermediate inputs used in the production process. The cost 
of labour is denoted by the wages and salaries variable and labour is captured by the number 
of employees. The variable of intermediate inputs is reflected by the cost of sales as it 
corresponds to the direct costs attributable in the production process17. Finally, the user cost 
of capital is formulated as 
𝑢𝑡 = [(𝑖 − 𝜋𝑒) + 𝛿]𝐹𝑡                                                                                                            (6) 
where (𝑖 − 𝜋𝑒) is the real interest rate, 𝐹𝑡  is the deflator of fixed asset investment for total 
economy and 𝛿 refers to the depreciation rate which is set equal to 5% across all industries18 
(Martins et al., 1996). The observations for this variable have been obtained by the AMECO 
and the World Bank databases over 2007-2016 and have been fixed across the sample. 
Thereby, the Hall-Roeger approach and the markup formulation will shed light to the pricing 
decisions of the UK food and beverages industries and how they are influenced by the 
structural effects of concentration, liquidity and exports. 
 
                                                          
15 The dataset includes firm-level balance sheets, profit and loss accounts and financial ratios of the constituent 
UK food and beverages firms. 
16 The FAME database contains information of companies registered at Companies House in the UK and it 
covers company financials, corporate structures, information on shareholders and subsidiaries with up to 10 
years of history. It includes 7 million companies across the UK, where 200,000 companies are in a summary 
format. However, given that only large companies are obliged to report to Companies House, information about 
turnover, assets and employment of medium and small firms may not be available. 
17 In particular, the cost of sales includes the cost of materials and services employed in the production process, 
excluding any indirect expenses such as distribution costs. 
18 An alternative specification of 𝛿 could refer to the firm-specific depreciation ratios calculated by the 
depreciation costs available in the FAME database (see Molnár and Bottini, 2010). 
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4. Empirical results and discussion 
4.1. Hall-Roeger model estimates 
The econometrics process is conducted under three steps which aim to present evidence of 
the price-cost margin exercised by the UK food and beverages industries and test whether 
pricing decisions are influenced by the structural effects of concentration, liquidity and 
exports. In particular, the first step employs the Hall-Roeger approach to estimate the markup 
ratio of the whole food and beverages sector over 2007-2016, thus obtaining an aggregate 
value of market power. The second step utilizes the cross-sectional specification to 
investigate the price-cost margin charged by the 32 4-digit level industries individually over 
2007-2016. Lastly, the third step tests the relationship between the markup ratios obtained by 
the previous step and the structural effects of concentration, liquidity and exports. The main 
aim of this step is to identify whether market concentration, liquidity constraints and exports 
intensity contribute to market power acquisition reflected in the pricing decisions of the 
constituent firms. 
Table 2: Diagnostics test results of the two Hall-Roeger approaches for the UK food and beverages 
sector. 
Food and 
beverages 
Hall-Roeger 
model 
 Hall-Roeger  
cross-sectional model 
Estimation 
technique 
FGLS  FGLS 
Pesaran scaled 
test (LM)a 
27.418** 
[0.00] 
 8.545** 
[0.00] 
Hausman testb 0.021  
[0.88] 
 - 
White testc 55.500** 
[0.00] 
 12.806  
[0.89] 
Likelihood 
Ratio testd 
114.17** 
[0.00] 
 21.812 
[0.57] 
Wooldridge 
testf 
57.187** 
[0.00] 
 96.183** 
[0.00] 
Breusch and 
Godfrey test 
(LM)e 
29.860**  
[0.00] 
 60.582**  
[0.00] 
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F-statistic 7095.38** 
[0.00] 
 4995.8** 
[0.00] 
Notes: The numbers in brackets indicate p-values.  
a H0: Cross-sectional independence (OLS) versus H1: Cross-sectional dependence (Random Effects Model). 
b H0: Random Effects Model versus H1: Fixed Effects Model. 
c H0: Homoskedasticity versus H1: Heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
d H0: Homoskedasticity (𝜎1
2 = ⋯ = 𝜎𝑇
2 = 𝜎2) versus H1: Heteroskedasticity (at least one 𝜎𝑡
2 ≠ 𝜎2), where 𝜎2 
is the variance of normal distribution. 
e H0: No first order serial correlation versus H1: First order serial correlation. 
f H0: No serial correlation versus H1: Serial correlation of at least k=2 order. 
* Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 Table 2 presents the diagnostic tests conducted for the Hall-Roeger approach and in 
particular, for equations (3) and (4). The whole panel set of the UK food and beverages 
industries is taken into account in order to identify any problems occurring in the data set. 
The first test refers to Pesaran’s scaled (LM) test (Pesaran, 2004) as corrected by Pesaran, 
Ullah and Yamagata (2008). This test identifies the presence of cross-sectional dependence 
across the panel entities and thus, whether a random effects model is more suitable compared 
to the pooled OLS estimation technique without any individual effects. The results are 
significant for all equations, suggesting that cross-sectional dependency strongly persists in 
the panel data set of this study. For this reason, the pooled OLS estimator will not result in 
correct inferences due to the presence of contemporaneous correlation and thus, the random 
and fixed effects models will have to be employed19. 
 The test developed by Wu (1973) and Hausman (1978) examines whether the random 
or the fixed effects model is more suitable to the Hall-Roeger approach. In particular, the null 
hypothesis assumes the absence of correlation between the explanatory variables and the 
individual effects; however, there exists correlation between those effects and the error term 
of each equation. For this reason, the random effects model is estimated by employing the 
generalized least squares (GLS) to take into account the latter presence of serial correlation.  
                                                          
19 See Tables A2 and A3 in appendix for the cross-sectional dependence, panel unit root and cointegration tests. 
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On the other hand, the fixed effects model assumes the presence of correlation 
between the regressors and the individual effects, which is the alternative hypothesis of this 
test. The estimation technique of the fixed effects model corresponds to the least squares 
dummy variable (LSDV) technique which takes into account that form of correlation. 
Consequently, the Hausman test compares those two models in order to conclude which one 
is more suitable to the data set. The results for this study suggest that the random effects 
model is more preferable for equation (3), while the fixed effects model is chosen for the 
cross-sectional specification (4).  
 Moreover, the presence of heteroskedasticity is tested by employing the likelihood 
ratio test and White’s test (White, 1980), while the presence of serial correlation is obtained 
by running the Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2002) and the Breusch and Godfrey (LM) test 
(Breusch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978). The presence of heteroskedasticity is identified only in 
equation (3) for the aggregate food and beverages sector; however, serial correlation persists 
in both equations, thus implying that the least squares estimator will provide inefficient 
estimates. For this reason, the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator is 
employed for equations (3) and (4) in order to take into account the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and provide robust estimates (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 
2011).  
 Alternative estimation techniques could be taken into account, such as the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) employed by several studies (Klette, 1999; Wooldridge, 2009; 
De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). The advantage of the GMM estimator compared to FGLS 
lies on the inclusion of instruments to take into account the presence of endogeneity if 
correlation emerges between the dependent variable and at least one of the explanatory 
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variables. For this reason, equations (3) and (4) are re-estimated under the GMM estimation 
technique to check the robustness of the final results20. 
 
 
Table 3: Markup estimations for the UK food and beverages sector. 
Parameters Hall-Roeger model Parameters Hall-Roeger  
cross-sectional model 
μ 1.120** 
[0.00] 
μ1011 1.191** 
[0.00] 
  μ1012 1.007** 
[0.00] 
  μ1013 1.087** 
[0.00] 
  μ1020 1.041** 
[0.00] 
  μ1031 1.060** 
[0.00] 
  μ1032 1.188** 
[0.00] 
  μ1039 1.193** 
[0.00] 
  μ1041 1.033** 
[0.00] 
  μ1042 1.227** 
[0.00] 
  μ1051 1.149** 
[0.00] 
  μ1052 1.275** 
[0.00] 
  μ1061 1.115** 
[0.00] 
  μ1062 1.019** 
[0.00] 
  μ1071 1.108** 
[0.00] 
  μ1072 1.129** 
[0.00] 
  μ1073 0.977** 
[0.00] 
  μ1081 1.184** 
[0.00] 
  μ1082 1.098** 
[0.00] 
                                                          
20 See Table A4 in appendix. 
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  μ1083 1.279** 
[0.00] 
  μ1084 1.125** 
[0.00] 
  μ1085 1.038** 
[0.00] 
  μ1086 1.333** 
[0.00] 
  μ1089 1.375** 
[0.00] 
  μ1091 1.115** 
[0.00] 
  μ1092 1.189** 
[0.00] 
  μ1101 1.800** 
[0.00] 
  μ1102 0.963** 
[0.00] 
  μ1103 1.194** 
[0.00] 
  μ1104 1.147** 
[0.00] 
  μ1105 1.418** 
[0.00] 
  μ1106 1.094** 
[0.00] 
  μ1107 1.335** 
[0.00] 
Notes: The numbers in brackets are p-values. 
* Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 
 Table 3 presents the price-cost margin estimates for the UK food and beverages 
industries over 2007-2016. In particular, the aggregate value for the whole sector estimated 
by equation (3) is equal to 1.12, which is higher than unity. This shows that the growth rate of 
output of the sector over 2007-2016 exceeds the growth rate of inputs by 12%, thus reflecting 
a positive markup ratio consistent with imperfect competitive conduct21. Relatively, this 
value is lower compared to other food and beverages sectors (Bottasso and Sembenelli, 2001; 
Christopoulou and Vermeulen, 2012; Amountzias, 2017) but it is consistent with the findings 
                                                          
21 This outcome is consistent with several studies for various economies. Imperfect competitive conduct has 
been identified by Boyle (2004) in the Irish manufacturing industry; Dobbelaere (2004) in the Belgian 
manufacturing industry; Dobrinsky et al. (2004) in the Hungarian and Bulgarian manufacturing industries; and 
Wilhelmsson (2006) in the Swedish food and beverages sector. 
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of Görg and Warzynski (2003, 2006). The markup ratio of the UK food and beverages sector 
over 1989-1997 is 1.121 which is almost identical with the estimated value of this study. This 
means that the markup ratio of the sector has remained quite steady over the years equal to 
12%22.  
An interpretation of this result may refer to the nature of competitive conduct. As 
many industries are subject to high competition (Harris and Ogbona, 2001), the price level 
adjusts to changes in the cost of inputs maintaining the markup ratio to a fixed value. 
Moreover, the effects of internationalisation and the implementation of the Single European 
Market (SEM) resulted in higher competition across the European Union forcing the pricing 
decisions of firms to be close to their marginal cost of production. This intuition is validated 
by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012) who provide evidence of an average EU markup 
ratio equal to 11% which is very close to the one of the UK food and beverages sector. 
An additional factor which have affected both production and pricing decisions 
corresponds to the intense competition of the retail industry and particularly, of the 
supermarkets. Hollingsworth (2004) and Seaton and Waterson (2013) argue that aggressive 
price reductions are employed by retail firms as a mean of competition to increase their 
market share. Consequently, manufacturing firms face squeezed levels of revenue and 
profitability as reductions in the selling price are transferred to the purchasing costs of 
intermediate manufacturing inputs. This may leave insufficient incentives to domestic 
producers to keep on operating in the market, as uncertainty and unforeseen liabilities may 
not be satisfied, thus dropping entrepreneurial activity and production overall. 
 
 
                                                          
22 Bellone et al. (2016) estimate a markup equivalent to 1.09 for the agro-food sector. This shows that even if the 
Hall-Roeger methodology disregards productivity shocks, competitive conduct in this sector is very intense. 
21 
 
Figure 1: Price-cost margin estimates for the 32 UK food and beverages industries over 2007-2016. 
Source: Estimations of equation (4). 
 
The individual price-cost margin estimates obtained by the cross-sectional Hall-
Roeger approach are presented in the second column of Table 3 and in Figure 1. The aim of 
this step is to identify the pricing behaviour of the 4-digit level industries over 2007-2016, 
which is the main contribution of this analysis to the literature of market power. In particular, 
the lowest markup ratio is charged by the industries of manufacture of pasta, noodles, 
couscous and similar farinaceous products (i.e. 1073) and of wine from grape (i.e. 1102). The 
price-cost margin is below but very close to unity, thus suggesting perfectly competitive 
conduct.  
On the other hand, the highest value is charged by the industries of manufacture of 
spirits (i.e. 1101) and of beer (i.e. 1105) which is equal to 1.80 and 1.41 respectively. This 
means that the highest price-cost margin charged in the food and beverages sector amounts 
for an 80% price markup over the cost of production. The remaining industries exercise a 
lower markup ratio which is consistent with the aggregate value of the sector. Consequently, 
the cross-sectional approach validates the argument that the majority of the UK food and 
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beverages industries charge a positive price-cost margin, reflecting imperfect competitive 
conduct. 
As it is presented in figure 1, the food industries of the sector tend to charge a lower 
price-cost margin on average compared to the beverages counterpart. However, the industries 
with the highest and lowest markup are part of the latter segment. In particular, the industry 
of distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits (i.e. 1101) charges the highest price-cost 
margin equal to 1.80. According to Amienyo (2012) and Doherty (2016a), this industry 
heavily relies on international trade due to the quality of spirits and particularly, of Scotch 
whiskey which has dominated the global markets. The exports to revenue ratio is the highest 
in the UK manufacturing industry overall equal to 78.4% with increasing demand coming 
from Taiwan and India.  
On the other hand, the industry of manufacture of wine from grape (i.e. 1102) 
experiences the lowest markup ratio in the whole sector equivalent to 0.96, suggesting that 
output has been growing slightly slower than inputs over 2007-2016. This is justified by the 
low profitability level of the constituent firms forcing them to innovate in order to acquire a 
higher market share in both domestic and international markets. According to Amienyo 
(2012) and Doherty (2016b), one of the major drawbacks of wine manufacturers is the 
weather conditions in the UK. Given the colder climate compared to Mediterranean countries, 
the quality of wine is poorer compared to those countries. For this reason, the UK wine 
market is one of the largest importers as the volume of imports approximately account for 
97% of domestic demand. However, over the last years, the warmer weather conditions and 
product differentiation (i.e. sparkling wine) boosted revenue due to higher consumer 
confidence and disposable income. 
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Overall, the UK food and beverages sector exhibits an aggregate price-cost margin 
equal to 1.12 which notes the presence of imperfect competitive conduct. The individual 
estimates of the constituent industries vary over 0.96-1.80, thus capturing the pricing 
decisions of the food and beverages firms23. For this reason, the third and last step of this 
study is going to test whether the structural effects of concentration, liquidity and exports 
contribute to the markup ratios charged by the UK food and beverages industries. 
4.2. Markup formulation 
 
Table 4. Estimates of the markup formulation for 2009, 2011, 2015 and 2016. 
Markup 
formulation 
2009 2011 2015 2016 
Constant  
term 
0.054 
[0.67] 
0.012 
[0.93] 
-0.129 
[0.38] 
-0.067 
[0.61] 
Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index 
0.211** 
[0.00] 
0.212** 
[0.00] 
0.177** 
[0.00] 
0.173** 
[0.00] 
Establishments 
ratio 
0.132** 
[0.00] 
0.136** 
[0.00] 
0.144** 
[0.00] 
0.102** 
[0.00] 
Liquidity ratio -0.187* 
[0.04] 
-0.143* 
[0.01] 
0.032 
[0.72] 
0.344* 
[0.02] 
Exports  
intensity 
0.102* 
[0.02] 
0.083* 
[0.03] 
0.105* 
[0.04] 
0.094* 
[0.04] 
Estimation 
technique 
WLS WLS GLS WLS 
Breusch Pagan 
Godfrey testa 
10.23* 
[0.03] 
10.78* 
[0.02] 
8.28 
[0.08] 
9.49* 
[0.04] 
White testb 23.39* 
[0.04] 
24.68* 
[0.03] 
22.03  
[0.07] 
23.76* 
[0.04] 
Durbin Watson 
testc 
2.38 2.43 2.91  2.47 
Bresuch and 
Godfrey test 
(LM)d 
1.34 
[0.50] 
2.22 
[0.32] 
7.24*  
[0.02] 
3.22 
[0.19] 
                                                          
23 De Loecker et al. (2016) provide evidence in favour of a more downward rigid behaviour reflected by the 
price level compared to marginal cost, thus increasing the price-cost margin.  
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F-statistic 35.92** 
[0.00] 
55.16** 
[0.00] 
30.18** 
[0.00] 
35.43** 
[0.00] 
 Notes: The numbers in brackets indicate p-values. 
a H0: Homoskedasticity versus H1: Heteroskedasticity of known form (𝜎𝑡
2 = ℎ(𝑎1) = 𝜎
2), where 𝜎2 is the 
variance of normal distribution. 
b H0: Homoskedasticity versus H1: Heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
c If 𝑑 ≥ 2 there is no evidence of first order positive serial correlation in the error term, where 𝑑 is the value of 
the Durbin Watson test. 
d H0: No serial correlation versus H1: Serial correlation of at least k=2 order. 
* Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 
 The markup formulation is estimated for 2009, 2011, 2015 and 2016 as those years 
are of crucial significance to the UK economy. In particular, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) and the ratio of establishments capture market concentration in each industry 
individually in terms of turnover and manufacturing units respectively. The estimates are 
significant and positively signed for each year. This outcome suggests that industries with 
higher concentration tend to charge a higher price-cost margin. This is consistent with the 
findings of Konings and Vandenbussche (2005)24 and Konings et al. (2005) suggesting that 
firms enjoying a relatively high market share will reflect their power on their pricing 
decisions which will result in a higher price-cost margin. Other studies investigating the 
effects of markups in various markets also draw similar conclusions on how competitive 
conduct is developed (Domowich et al., 1988; Badinger, 2007; Bellone et al., 2016)25. 
The estimates of both measures are stable over the years with the HHI ranging over 
0.17-0.21 and the ratio of establishments over 0.10-0.14. This outcome indicates that firms 
owning the largest share in each market tend to increase their price-cost margin according to 
their market share and establishments. An interpretation of such behaviour may refer to the 
implementation of austerity policies over 2010-2011. As growth became slower over 2011-
                                                          
24 Although the authors did not include the HHI in the final results, their findings point to the same outcome. 
25 It is also worth mentioning that similar studies such as Pontuch (2011) and Braun and Raddatz (2016) find 
that industries with limited competition tend to charge a higher markup. However, limited competition is 
calculated as the average of the price-cost margin of an industry in a country, thus neglecting the role of 
concentration. For this reason, the HHI has been chosen over alternative indicators. 
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2015, firms were more reluctant to increase their price level in order to maintain consumer 
demand to a satisfactory level even if they had the ability to pass cost increases to the selling 
price (World Bank, 2016b).  
The second effect refers to liquidity expressed as the ratio of net current assets over 
liabilities. This indicator reflects the ability of firms to satisfy their current liabilities with the 
available net current assets in the short-run which can be liquefied immediately26. This can 
also be viewed as an indicator of short-run liability based solvency ratio which highly 
depends on whether current liabilities exceed net current assets. It is expected that firms 
exhibiting higher liquidity ratios will be able to charge a higher price-cost margin given that 
they can offset any losses in consumer demand with sufficient liquidity cushions27. However, 
if uncertainty prevails in the economy and future expectations are not very optimistic then 
firms may choose to invest in liquid assets in order to be prepared for any unforeseen 
circumstances and thus, minimize their losses. 
The estimates that capture the relationship between the markup and liquidity ratios 
suggest that both behaviours have been adopted by the UK food and beverages industries. 
The values range over -0.18 and 0.34 capturing an inelastic but significant effect of liquidity 
on pricing decisions. The inverse relationship between the price-cost margin and available 
liquidity validates the findings of several studies arguing that industries facing financial 
constraints are more likely to increase the selling price to acquire additional revenues 
(Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1995, 1996; Campello, 2003; Lane, 2012; Braun and Raddatz, 
2016). Such decision is consistent with a profit-seeking behaviour under which firms try to 
extract consumer surplus from their customers given the degree of future uncertainty. 
                                                          
26 This indicator has been formulated according to Makaew and Maksimovic (2013). 
27 This is similar to the leadership effect discussed by Olive (2008) under which profitable firms have the ability 
to pass cost increases on the selling price due to sufficient profit cushions. 
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However, the positive value obtained for 2016 contradicts the aforementioned 
findings, but it is consistent with Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) and Busse (2002). The 
main argument is that firms facing financial constraints are more likely to engage in price 
wars. This behaviour intends to attract customers through a lower selling price level and thus, 
increase their market share and revenues. Moreover, firms with lower liquidity constraints 
will be able to charge higher prices as any unexpected losses in consumer demand can be 
covered by liquidity reserves. This outcome suggests that as the UK economy overall shows 
encouraging signs of growth, speculative behaviour may be adopted by particular firms in 
order to increase their profits28. 
Consequently, over 2009 the UK food and beverages industries with the highest 
liquidity ratio appear to be consistent with the precautionary motive as they tend to demand 
liquidity to respond to potential risks by sustaining a lower markup ratio (Kimball, 1991). 
However, over 2016 those industries behave according to the speculative motive as they wish 
to exploit consumer surplus through a higher price-cost margin in order to increase net 
current assets and thus, be prepared over a future fall in consumer income. 
The third and last effect corresponds to whether export-oriented firms tend to charge a 
higher price-cost margin. Görg and Warzynski (2003) showed that firms with higher value of 
exports to turnover ratio correspond to such behaviour suggesting that international trade may 
provide market power in domestic markets due to high degree of efficiency. The estimates of 
this study verify this claim as the elasticity of markup ratio with respect to exports intensity 
ranges over 0.08-0.10. This outcome is consistent with the findings presented by Bernard et 
                                                          
28 A complementary behaviour to this process may refer to the acquisition of market share through lower price-
cost margins. If a lower price level results in increased revenue due to additional demand, then firms might force 
their competitors to exit the market resulting in additional power and liquidity. Thereby, they will be able to 
hold more money as precaution to unforeseen circumstances (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). 
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al. (2003) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) who argued that exporters charge on 
average a higher price-cost margin compared to the remaining firms29. 
This outcome occurs because firms charge higher markup ratios in international 
markets where consumers may have different needs and characteristics. According to O’Hara 
(2015), austerity policies resulted in slower income and demand growth in the UK economy 
over 2011-2015. For this reason, export-oriented industries may have tried to substitute part 
of domestic demand through the exploitation of consumer surplus in the international 
markets30. Moreover, as exporting firms operate in various different markets and try to adjust 
to particular market characteristics, they become more productive and innovative to satisfy 
the needs of consumers. This intuition is supported by the studies of Baumers et al. (2016) 
and De Loecker (2007) showing that the productivity gap between exporters and domestic 
firms keeps on increasing over time. For this reason, such actions may increase the price-cost 
margin in order to capture these types of investment31. 
Overall, the results validate the claims of Görg and Warzynski (2003, 2006) that the 
UK food and beverages sector behaves under imperfect competitive conduct over 2007-2016 
exhibiting a price-cost margin equal to 12%. Moreover, the underlying model allows for 
individual heterogeneity in the pricing decisions of the constituent 32 4-digit level industries. 
The estimates are consistent with overpricing decisions with the exception of three industries 
(i.e. 1012, 1073, 1102) who appear to behave according to perfect competition. Lastly, the 
effects of concentration and exports exhibit a positive relationship with the markup ratio, 
                                                          
29 See Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) for an extended theoretical analysis capturing the relationship between 
exports and markup ratios. 
30 Bernard et al. (2003) argued that more efficient producers face lower costs than their competitors allowing 
them to set higher markup ratios. 
31 Also see Taymaz and Yilmaz (2015) for a similar analysis in the Turkish manufacturing industry using export 
intensity as well as import penetration ratios to capture their effect on the markups charged by the constituent 
sectors. 
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whilst the elasticity of pricing decisions with respect to liquidity is negative over 2009 and 
2011, but positive over 2016. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The present analysis extended the investigation of market power in the UK food and 
beverages sector by employing the markup model of Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995). The 
inclusion of cross-sectional individual effects in the panel sample provides evidence of the 
price-cost margin charged by the 32 4-digit level NACE Rev.2 industries over 2007-2016 
which is the main contribution to the empirical literature of market power. Overall, the 
majority of the industries appear to exhibit a markup ratio close to perfect competition as the 
value of the whole sector is 1.12 suggesting that the growth rate of output exceeds the growth 
rate of inputs by 12%. Moreover, more concentrated and export-oriented industries tend to 
charge a higher markup ratio while available liquidity seems to have a different effect on 
pricing decisions over the years. 
 The aforementioned results show that competition, liquidity constraints and export 
orientation are three structural elements that significantly influence the pricing decisions of 
the UK food and beverages firms. However, there are still many factors that must be taken 
into account in order to provide a fuller picture of the production and pricing decisions of the 
sector. In particular, it would be important to test the cyclicality of markups in the sector as 
has been presented by Braun and Raddatz (2016). If markups tend to be either procyclical or 
counter-cyclical, then it would also be useful to test whether liquidity constrained or export 
orientated firms tend to follow a similar behaviour with the whole sector.  
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Moreover, indicators of productivity can also be taken into account in order test 
whether the suggestions of relevant studies such as De Loecker (2007) and Bellone et al. 
(2016) hold in the UK food and beverages sector. Finally, the present analysis can also be 
conducted under the scope of quality differentiation and how innovative firms can shape their 
market share according to the quality of their products (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). If 
those factors are added in the model, then the present findings for the whole sector will be 
bolstered. 
Overall, the current analysis supports the significant contribution of exporting 
industries in the pricing decisions of the UK food and beverages sector and according to 
economic conditions, liquidity plays an important role in the formulation of the markup ratio.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Classification of industries according to NACE Rev.2 classification. 
1011 Processing and preserving of meat 
1012 Processing and preserving of poultry meat 
1013 Production of meat and poultry meat products 
1020 Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and molluscs 
1031 Processing and preserving of potatoes 
1032 Manufacture of fruit and vegetable juice 
1039 Other processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables 
1041 Manufacture of oils and fats 
1042 Manufacture of margarine and similar edible fats 
1051 Operation of dairies and cheese making 
1052 Manufacture of ice cream 
1061 Manufacture of grain mill products 
1062 Manufacture of starches and starch products 
1071 Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh pastry goods and 
cakes 
1072 Manufacture of rusks and biscuits; manufacture of preserved 
pastry goods and cakes 
1073 Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar 
farinaceous products 
1081 Manufacture of sugar 
1082 Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 
1083 Processing of tea and coffee 
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1084 Manufacture of condiments and seasonings 
1085 Manufacture of prepared meals and dishes 
1086 Manufacture of homogenised food preparations and dietetic food 
1089 Manufacture of other food products nec 
1091 Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals 
1092 Manufacture of prepared pet foods 
1101 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 
1102 Manufacture of wine from grape 
1103 Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines 
1104 Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages 
1105 Manufacture of beer 
1106 Manufacture of malt 
1107 Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral waters and 
other bottled waters 
Source: FAME database. 
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Table A2: Pesaran’s cross-section dependence and panel unit root tests. 
Variables CD test Unit root test 
𝛥𝑌𝑡 61.772** [0.00] -8.913** [0.00] 
𝛥𝑋𝑡 60.729** [0.00] -9.606** [0.00] 
ℎ𝑡 5.629** [0.00] -2.332*   [0.04] 
∆ℎ𝑡 - -12.56** [0.00] 
𝑒𝑠𝑡 6.125** [0.00] 1.001      [0.51] 
∆𝑒𝑠𝑡 - -4.478** [0.00] 
𝑙𝑟𝑡 7.187** [0.00] -3.630** [0.00] 
∆𝑙𝑟𝑡 - -15.32** [0.00] 
𝑥𝑝𝑡 13.272** [0.00] -1.550     [0.20] 
∆𝑥𝑝𝑡 - -14.97** [0.00] 
Notes: The null hypothesis of Pesaran’s (2004) CD test is cross-sectional independency. The null hypothesis of  
Pesaran’s (2007) refers to the presence of a unit root in the panel series. The numbers in brackets are p-values. 
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance. 
 
 
Table A3: Westerlund’s (2008) cointegration test for the Hall-Roeger models. 
 
Equation (3) 
𝐷𝐻𝑔 13.282** 
[0.000] 
𝐷𝐻𝑝 16.911** 
[0.000] 
Equation (4) 
𝐷𝐻𝑔 15.116** 
[0.00] 
𝐷𝐻𝑝 17.945** 
[0.00] 
Notes: 𝐷𝐻𝑔 denotes the group mean Durbin-Hausman statistic and 𝐷𝐻𝑝 is the panel statistic. The bandwidth 
selection  𝑀𝑖 corresponds to the largest integer less than 4(
𝑇
100
)2/9 as proposed by Newey and West (1994) 
which is equal to 2. The values in brackers are p-values. 
** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table A4: Markup estimations under the GMM estimation technique. 
Parameters Hall-Roeger model Parameters Hall-Roeger  
cross-sectional model 
μ 1.154** 
[0.00] 
μ1011 1.213** 
[0.00] 
  μ1012 0.967** 
[0.00] 
  μ1013 1.088** 
[0.00] 
  μ1020 1.003** 
[0.00] 
  μ1031 1.065** 
[0.00] 
  μ1032 0.997** 
[0.00] 
  μ1039 1.197** 
[0.00] 
  μ1041 1.058** 
[0.00] 
  μ1042 1.226** 
[0.00] 
  μ1051 1.151** 
[0.00] 
  μ1052 1.525** 
[0.00] 
  μ1061 1.110** 
[0.00] 
  μ1062 1.224** 
[0.00] 
  μ1071 1.108** 
[0.00] 
  μ1072 1.130** 
[0.00] 
  μ1073 1.025** 
[0.00] 
  μ1081 1.185** 
[0.00] 
  μ1082 1.102** 
[0.00] 
  μ1083 0.999** 
[0.00] 
  μ1084 1.077** 
[0.00] 
  μ1085 1.189** 
[0.00] 
  μ1086 1.317** 
[0.00] 
  μ1089 1.372** 
[0.00] 
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  μ1091 1.114** 
[0.00] 
  μ1092 1.240** 
[0.00] 
  μ1101 1.431** 
[0.00] 
  μ1102 1.217** 
[0.00] 
  μ1103 1.113** 
[0.00] 
  μ1104 1.123** 
[0.00] 
  μ1105 1.420** 
[0.00] 
  μ1106 1.037** 
[0.00] 
  μ1107 1.170** 
[0.00] 
Notes: The numbers in brackets are p-values. 
* Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 
